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The concerns that arise over the use of technology in the classroom – what kind of 
technology to use, how frequently, and in what manner it should be integrated – are 
some of the most pressing pedagogical questions today. Those participating in this 
debate might be surprised to hear that intellectuals and self-described 
“technologues” around 1800 also considered the challenges of integrating technology 
into university curricula. People who were thinking and writing about technology 
around 1800 faced a problem which still haunts us today: how to define the object of 
study in the first place. As Carl Mitcham and Eric Schatzberg have argued, the term 
technology and the field of study encompassed by the “technological sciences” are 
“loaded with contested connotations and interpretations, in part because definition 
and associated conceptualization has implications for other issues, such as the 
relations between technology, science, and art.” [1]
Around 1800, as today, the question of technology in the classroom went well beyond 
the study and use of technological objects. The instruction of technology was also 
attuned to the concepts used to define the technological status of these objects in the 
first place as well as to the question of what a “science” of technology might be. In 
the German context, which is the focus of the present essay, the word itself was still 
a neologism. In the 1770s, Johann Beckmann claimed to do something new by 
deliberately replacing a term he considered obsolete, Kunstgeschichte (which 
referred a history of the “arts” in the broadest sense), with Technologie. [2] The 
situation is, however, somewhat more complex than Beckmann would have us 
believe: not only was the German word Technologie already used in various ways 
prior to Beckmann, the semantic and discursive histories of Technologie throughout 
the eighteenth century are overshadowed by the growing awareness that it is, in fact, 
quite difficult to define its scope. When the question of technology as a subject for 
the classroom garnered attention toward the end of the eighteenth century, it also 
provoked the basic question of how best to systematically teach an imperfect science.
These issues connect directly to the nascent theoretical reflections on technology as 
a word, concept, science, and academic discipline in the German context of the long 
eighteenth century, well before anything resembling a “philosophy of technology” 
was established. The present essay, connected to a larger research and translation 
project devoted to eighteenth-century perspectives on technology, does not intend to 
make an exhaustive historical argument, but rather to introduce readers to a few of 
the key players of the time period and to sketch out a narrative that connects the 
question of technology as it was framed at that time with the problem of how to teach 
it. These remarks, which can be seen as making a small contribution to a complicated 
puzzle, will focus primarily on two general topics: how Beckmann’s “translation” of 
technology in the 1770s connects to its development as an imperfect science around 
1800, and the problems – as well as opportunities – that emerged when technology 
was considered for the classroom. An additional aim, apart from commenting on the 
epistemological problems surrounding the history of technology during this time 
period, is to show that one of the most peculiar products of these technological 
discussions is the imagining of a special kind of observer: one invested with critical 
skills and the authority to make a kind of “mechanical judgement” with regard to 
objects and the science of technology as a whole.
 
From a Translated Word to an Imperfect Science
As a German word, Technologie is in the eighteenth century most frequently 
associated with Cameralism, an economic term that emerged in seventeenth-century 
German principalities, and whose primary concerns were “directed to the state’s 
interest in its resources, in better administration and in the common good, the 
purpose being in order to increase the prince’s incomes, establish a sustainable 
development of economy, and create a well-ordered state.” [3] Beckmann writes in 
the preface to the first edition of his Instruction Book for Technology [Anleitung zur 
Technologie] that “the knowledge of handcrafts, factories and manufactured goods is 
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indispensable to everyone who wishes to dedicate himself to statecraft and the 
science of cameralism.” [4] The administrators-in-training of the German 
principalities were supposed to have a good working knowledge of both the liberal 
and the illiberal arts. Yet Cameralism was only the latest resting point of a long 
discursive migration of the word “technology” since antiquity. For the Greeks, the 
cognate word referred to a systematic treatment of something, such as a grammar, [5]
 which is also the sense in which Cicero borrowed it for Latin: one can think of his 
de Oratore as a technology of rhetorical technique. The defining element of 
technology as it is used in this earlier sense is a collection of rules designed for 
application. One still finds the understanding of technology as a collection of rules 
through the seventeenth century, where its application was expanded to include 
other areas of study, such as theology; Gaspard Streso’s 1633 Technologia Theologica
, for example, applied rules of logical analysis to theological tenets. As far as the 
German context is concerned, Christian Wolff provides a good point of reference for 
understanding the early-eighteenth century discussion on technology at the cusp of 
Latin and German as the scholarly language of choice. In his Philosophia rationalis 
sive logica (1728), Wolff offers this simple, yet programmatic definition:
It is also possible to have a philosophy of arts, even if this has been 
hitherto neglected. You can call it technics [technica] or technology [
technologia]. Therefore, technology is the knowledge [sciencia] of arts 
and of works of art, or, if you prefer, the knowledge of those works which 
are completed by men with the instruments of their body, especially the 
hands. [6]
Seibicke has argued that “with this special use of both expressions [technica and 
technologia],” Wolff has laid “the basis for the development of the concept of 
technology [des Technikbegriffs] so important for modernity,” and that one can see 
this as the first step in the “program of a systematic science of technology [
Technikwissenschaft].” [7] Certainly, several aspects of Wolff’s definition bear 
directly on later eighteenth-century usage: first, technology is primarily understood 
as a theoretical enterprise, one that deals both with the knowledge (or science) of the 
arts and with the products of that knowledge – the works of art themselves. “Art,” in 
this context, is understood in the broad sense of man-made things before being 
specified to works of the hand, but otherwise makes no distinction between the fine 
and banausic arts. Secondly, this definition articulates an important point of 
bifurcation. Wolff offers a choice between technica and technologia – as if to say that 
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we could conceivably have a philosophy of arts without the “logos” which comprises 
scientific discourse – before leaning towards the latter. Over time, the distinction 
between technics and technology takes different forms, including the immediacy of 
social practices vs. the ideas which encompass them. [8]
Some idea of a technology is therefore already active in the German context when 
Johann Beckmann writes, in the fourth edition to his Instruction Book, “I first dared 
in 1772 to use technology [Technologie] instead of the customary designation history 
of arts [Kunstgeschichte], which is at least as incorrect as the designation history of 
nature [Naturgeschichte] for the theory of nature [Naturkunde].” [9] A few of 
Beckmann’s contemporaries, such as Daniel Heinrich Bensen, professor of Cameral 
Sciences in Erlangen in the 1790s, found Beckmann’s statement problematic: “Why 
does one not prefer, if one is in agreement on the general concept of a handicraft [
Handwerk], to use the German word Handwerkskunde [study of handcrafts] which 
simply and precisely expresses the exact same thing?” [10] Later historians, including 
Seibicke, claim with hindsight that Beckmann’s Instruction Book “marks the change 
from the quantity of techn(olog)ical knowledge into the new quality of a 
techn(olog)ical science.” [11] Such disputes aside, Beckmann does go at least a step 
farther than Wolff’s notion of a “science of arts and works of art” when he articulates 
the distinction between Technologie and Kunstgeschichte; according to Beckmann, a 
history of art (or the arts in general) might describe the invention and fate of a 
particular craft, but “technology is something which explains, in an orderly manner, 
and which establishes the foundation and logical consequence of all kinds of works [
Arbeiten].” [12] The tension inherent in the eighteenth-century discussion on 
technology does not just emerge as a distinction between Wolff’s and Beckmann’s 
approaches, however. There is also a third source to bring into this conversation, one 
which stands for another problem inherent in the emerging reflections on 
technology: Johann Zedler’s Universal Lexicon.
The significance in Beckmann’s act of translation has less to do with a linguistic 
transferal that exports technology among languages than a translation from one way 
of identifying a field of thought to another. By contrast, the definition of Technologie
in Johann Zedler’s lexicon – a massive, sixty-eight volume project published between 
1731 and 1754 – is based on words. For Zedler, technology is synonymous with 
Kunst-Wörter-Lehre. As a doctrine of Kunstwörter (where a Kunstwort is understood 
as a terminus technicus or technical term), technology becomes a way of organizing 
things that belong to people of a particular profession. Along these lines, a carpenter 
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will have specific words for his tools and techniques, as will all other craftsman. To 
the degree that Zedler’s definition of “technology” suggests a collection of these 
words, it is situated in the classical rhetorical tradition of Cicero. Yet even if Zedler’s 
definition is clear enough, the question of what it denotes poses a problem for the 
German language. The technical terms of the different arts often required mastery of 
Latin, which led to the common practice translating the technical terms into German 
somewhat arbitrarily, “without the approval of others” so as to “cause obscurity.” [13]
In other words, based on Zedler’s lexicon, it is clear that the early translation of 
technology as a concept from Latin to German carries with it the problem of 
translation in general – at least as a problem of the parts (i.e., the technical terms), if 
not yet the whole.
Against the backdrop of Wolff and Zedler, Beckmann’s own “translation” of 
technology therefore takes a different shape altogether, beginning with a re-
definition of his point of departure. Because Beckmann understands himself as 
departing from a history of the arts, he requires a theoretical apparatus, something 
closer to a science. This idea is fundamental to the definition of technology found in 
his Instruction Book, where he writes that “technology is the science [Wissenschaft] 
which teaches the processing of things made by nature … the knowledge of 
handcrafts. [14] What Beckmann has in mind is inspired as much by a “philosophy of 
the arts” as it is to by Zedler’s understanding of technology in terms of a theory of 
technical terms, albeit with a few key differences. Having established in not-too-
specific language that technology is a science that handles potentially everything in 
nature, a second part of the definition goes a step further to define the place of the 
discourse of technology in society in contradistinction to the physical place of the 
workshop:
Instead of being shown in the workshops, how one should follow the 
directives and customs of the master, technology gives thorough 
instruction, with systematic order, how one should, for the same purpose, 
find the means, drawn from true principles and reliable experience, and 
how one should explain and use those phenomena which appear during 
processing. [15]
If technology, according to Beckmann, can act in the stead of the master craftsman 
who gives instructions in the workshop in that it provides a “systematic order” and 
“thorough directions” based upon both principles and practice, then it is more than a 
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theoretical science. Beckmann’s technological project implies a collapse of both 
discursive and spatial distinctions: that is, the difference between theory and 
practice, as well as the difference between the work (and place) of the scholar and 
that of the craftsman. And although Beckmann wants to establish his “technology” in 
a trajectory apart from Zedler’s by claiming it as a science whose system achieves 
validity to the degree that it is not taking part in a history, he must nonetheless 
confront the technology of words as posed by Zedler by re-scripting the space of the 
workshop, with its profusion of technical terms, its clash of vernaculars. Through 
Beckmann’s imagined projection into the space of the workshop, two technologies – 
the one, a science of arts and the other, a theory of words – become deeply 
intertwined.
To illustrate the connection between technological lexica and systems of technology 
more clearly, and to underscore the problems of both as pedagogical topics, I am 
going to draw briefly on two examples, the first from Beckmann’s preface to 
Jacobsson’s “Technological Dictionary” (1781-84) and the second from Georg 
Friedrich Lamprecht’s Lehrbuch der Technologie [Textbook of Technology] (1787).
[16] With regard to the former: Beckmann writes that what one can expect to find in 
a technological dictionary such as Jacobsson’s is not just the technical terms that 
refer to the methods of production unique to the various arts, but also those words 
which refer to materials used by artisans, different kinds of crafts, and the wares 
produced by them. Much of Beckmann’s admiration for Jacobsson comes from the 
enormity of this task, whose difficulty is only increased by the number of synonyms 
and dialect words for any given term; the number of crafts alone is “so large, that it 
is difficult only to compile a complete index of them” not to mention the tools and 
materials unique to each. [17] The comparison which Beckmann draws from 
throughout the preface to the dictionary, and which dates back to his earlier work, is 
with the study of nature. Already in the Instruction Book he invoked the name of 
Charles Linné, the eighteenth-century botanist renowned for generating a descriptive 
technical language to conform to his far-ranging observations of natural phenomena.
[18] The proliferation of crafts and the words of human artifice is second only to the 
number of phenomena in the natural world. Yet the analogy is not only between two 
scientific discourses of comparable enormity. Beckmann’s preface also insists that in 
order to understand the multitude of words drawn from the most various kinds of 
crafts, we also need at our disposal a set of auxiliary sciences [Hülfswissenschaften] 
in addition to the theory of nature, including mineralogy, chemistry, metallurgy, and 
mathematics. [19] Which is to say that the “parts” of technology, in addition to being 
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a collection of words, are also a collection of mutually implicated discourses and 
disciplines.
One can compare the challenges posed by genre of the technological dictionary as 
described by Beckmann with the system proposed by Lamprecht’s Textbook of 
Technology. For Lamprecht, the function of technology as a science is largely 
pedagogical: it teaches the principles and means by which those products of nature 
that would otherwise not be useful to man can be made into useful things. Because 
technology teaches the manifold ways of processing nature for human advantage, it 
must, according to Lamprecht, necessarily include a theory of the arts. The problem 
with his plan, Lamprecht soon realizes, is simply the inordinate number of them. In 
this regard, the challenge of the technological dictionary is analogous to that of the 
technological treatise: both must subsume a manifold in the name of technology. 
Whereas one deals with words, the other deals with the discourses of the arts in the 
broadest sense. In each case, the line between the categories of the technological vs. 
the non-technological is difficult to define.
Informing Lamprecht’s treatise is a series of attempts to define a theoretical basis for 
technology in such a way as to clarify the distinction between technology and other 
discourses. Yet each of these is met by failure. For example, Lamprecht cannot 
exclude the fine arts for obeying rules of taste and beauty, because the same can be 
said of some of the mechanical arts as well, such as the production of jewelry or fine 
watches; from this perspective, “aesthetics” could never establish itself as an 
autonomous discourse, as was the tendency in the eighteenth century, and 
Lamprecht even goes so far as to refer to it as an auxiliary science (see §12), just as 
Beckmann does of botany, chemistry, and the rest. Similar attempts to define 
technology’s theoretical basis – such as drawing on traditional distinctions between 
theoretical and practical arts, or productive and non-productive ones in the 
Aristotelian sense; or even through distinctions based on technique, on product, or 
use – meet with just as little success. Lamprecht’s only recourse is to devise a 
strategy that has more to do with the concept of numerical frequency than with 
principles of inclusion and exclusion: “Error-free divisions and completely logical 
concepts of the separate parts of technology seem after all attempts, because of the 
countless number of entirely different objects, to [that] belong to the category of 
impossible things.” [20] Lamprecht continues by suggesting that the order of a 
technological system is simplified by beginning with explanations of those techniques 
for dealing with nature which apply to the majority of crafts, and continuing with the 
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more specific – in other words, through distinctions that hold up quantitatively, 
rather than qualitatively.
Even if it is clear by now that the vast scope of the arts, coupled by an inadequate 
theoretical grounding, hinders technology’s systematic cohesion, it is important to 
ask the question, what kind of knowledge was treated in a technological instruction 
manual. The question bears directly upon the pedagogical challenges of technology 
that will be addressed in the second section of this essay. In Beckmann’s Instruction 
Book, for example, some chapters contain their own taxonomies of the kind of 
knowledge required for an adequate understanding of technology. One can consider 
this passage from the chapter on numismatics, whose description echoes the 
problems of the technological project as a whole:
The science of coining [Münzwissenschaft] is the name of the system of all 
knowledge which have been given rise to and made necessary by coins [
Münze]. A science of inconceivable extent! Its noblest parts seem to me to 
be the following.
1. The technological part or the art of coins [Münzkunst], which teaches 
the preparation of coins.
2. The historical part, which deals with the origin of money and coins, and 
their various changes.
3. The antiquarian part, which teaches the knowledge of old, no longer 
circulating coins, and which until now has been dealt with under the 
name numismatics [Numismatic].
4. The mercantilist part, which teaches the intrinsic and extrinsic worth of 
coins in circulation and their relation to each other.
5. The political part, which contains that which, where currency is 
concerned, is to be observed with regard to public affairs. [21]
Of note in this entry is that the “technological” per se is only one part of the 
“technology” of numismatics. Adequate training in this field requires more than 
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knowledge of how coins are produced: it also requires an understanding of how they 
are traded and how their past and present value is determined, both in intrinsic 
terms and for society as a whole.
Other entries in Beckmann’s Instruction Book foreground the material factors of 
production more clearly. The chapter on hat-making, to take just one example, is 
divided into seven paragraphs: an introductory statement on the materials, where 
they are found, which ones are most valuable, as well as the basic method of 
production (for example, that hats are ‘felted’ instead of woven); a paragraph on the 
preparation of animal hair; an explanation of how the hair is sorted; the processing of 
the felt pieces or Fache; techniques of Walken, whereby felt is manipulated into a 
circle shape; how the felt is smoothed with pumice and fish skin before dyeing; and 
the washing and drying of hats after dyeing. [22] What kind of knowledge do these 
paragraphs impart? What should a reader – or student – of technology be able to do 
after working through this chapter? Reading about hat-making does not directly 
impart the manual dexterity required to be a hat-maker, but it does impart the 
elements of what can be developed into techniques of discrimination relevant to the 
process. What can be acquired through reading are such factors as an appreciation 
for the quality of materials, the evenness of the felt, the richness of color, and the 
shape of the hat. In short, most of what one needs in order to determine the greater 
or lesser perfection of the technological product is contained in these paragraphs.
 
Teaching Technology and Technological 
Observation
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The example of hat-making describes an environment where local acts of 
discernment and discrimination are necessary, actions that can be generalized to the 
science as a whole. Like an aesthetically-trained observer of a work of art, the 
technologue is one who tries to intuit order from a sensory manifold. Unlike the 
observer of a work of art, however, the technologue’s sense of the manifold entails 
significantly greater degrees of complexity. Instead of one single system of parts to 
whole, multiple such relationships of parts to whole inhabit the technologue’s gaze. 
These include the relationships of technology to the “arts” in general; various kinds 
of knowledge encompassed by a single “art,” and knowledge of either the machines 
or tool-use – which also demands a kind of synthetic understanding of individual 
parts or actions – included in a component activity of a particular art.
The implied connection between science, aesthetics, and technology is firmly in place 
by the end of the eighteenth century. It had already been suggested by the Italian 
economist-philosopher Antonio Genovesi (1713-1769), whose Lezioni di Commercio o 
sia d’Economia civile (1764) was translated into German as the Gründsätze der 
bürgerlichen Oekonomie [Principles of the Bourgeois Economy]. [23] The pinnacle of 
culture, writes Genovesi, is defined by the “blooming” of the (technological) arts and 
is matched by achievements in literature and science, because together they not only 
expand mankind’s understanding, they “enlighten him, and show him in the most 
insignificant professions that which he would otherwise not see.” [24] A footnote is 
attached: “Every art, however insignificant it may be, has its principles, and its 
mechanism, which only the philosopher can perceive. Thus the theories of the lowest 
arts be brought into a science. This proves the necessity of calculation and of a 
reasoned mechanics [meccanica ragionata].” [25]
Embedded within this passage from Genovesi are the elements of what will 
eventually be developed into a pedagogical program based on the joint assumptions 
that it is instructive to observe the techniques and materials used by practitioners of 
the mechanical arts and that the rational observer is in the position to improve upon 
them. [26] Genovesi was also important for German technologues, such as Beckmann, 
who uses the quote as an epigraph to his Instruction Book, as well as for the lesser-
known Franz Benedikt Herrmann, who was, at the end of the eighteenth century, a 
central figure in the development of a technologically-informed pedagogy. Hermann’s 
guide to learning technology, Über die Einführung des Studiums der Technologie [
On the Introduction to the Study of Technology], picks up on the same passage from 
Genovesi, but misquotes it in a peculiar way, one that reveals something about his 
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own agenda. It is instructive to compare the 1776 German edition of Genovesi’s text 
with the equivalent passage in Hermann’s in order to see the differences as to how 
they are rendered into German:
“Jede Kunst, so gering sie auch sey, hat ihre Grundsätze, und ihren 
Mechanismus, denbblos der Philosoph wahrnehmen kann.”
[Every art, however insignificant it might be, has its principles, and its 
mechanism, that only the philosopher can perceive] (English version 
Genovesi’s German translation by August Witzmann) [27]
“Jede Kunst, so gering sie auch ist, hat ihren eigenthümlichen 
Mechanismum, und ihre Grundsätze, welche nur von Philosophen erklärt 
werden können”
[Every art, however insignificant it is, has its unique mechanism, and its 
principles, which can only be explained by philosphers] (English version 
of Genovesi’s German translation by Benedikt Hermann) [28]
Genovesi’s philosopher-observer perceives the principles of the mechanical arts 
(which is also faithful to the original Italian, esser avvertigto), whereas Herrmann’s is 
the one who is able to take the extra step of transforming perceptions into 
explanations. This kind of philosophical work, he argues elsewhere in the same 
treatise, stands in sharp distinction to the “uselessness” of traditional metaphysical 
speculations.
Herrmann’s own working definition of technology understands it as a synthesis of 
observation and discrimination. In a kind of circular thinking peculiar to the science 
of technology, Herrmann emphasizes science itself “shows” the observer precisely 
those things which are organized under the heading of a science of technology. For 
example, it shows:
…from which material, and how our articles of clothing are made; what 
we have to observe, in order to distinguish the good wares from the bad, 
and how we have to arrange to improve what is bad or faulty. [29]
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…wherefrom those materials must be taken, which we have need of for 
the establishment of our dwellings… [and] thereby teaches, which are the 
best, how they must be processed, arranged, applied and maintained. [30]
Technology is nothing less than a world view that “must,” according to Hermann and 
others, be treated as a science that can be imparted to others. Part of the motivation 
is regional competition: France, for example, is perceived of as being ahead of the 
German territories both in the teaching and practice of technology (the subject of 
§10), even though the French language had at that time not yet adopted the word 
technology in the Beckmannian sense, nor generated an equivalent theoretical 
reflection on la technologie.
With these challenges in mind, Herrmann devotes considerable energy to the 
problem of technological instruction. After identifying several requirements, such as 
visiting workshops, purchasing books, and the establishment of state schools, he 
reflects upon the challenges associated with each. In part, it is a question of class 
prejudice: “Wealthy youth,” he writes, “have no desire to study technology” and “the 
poorest cannot travel to visit workshops and will not receive permission to enter local 
workshops and factories.” [31] There is also the risk that, once admitted, workers will 
have no desire to reveal trade secrets. [32] An additional problem concerns the 
technological books themselves: “young people reading these books will not 
understand the vocabulary” because “they have no familiarity with the objects,” [33]
not to mention the fact that these books, with their numerous illustrations, were for 
poorer students prohibitively expensive.
The fields necessary for the education of future technologues, which include 
agriculture, knowledge of the technical arts (Kunstwirtschaft), the study of private 
trade (Privathandlungswissenschaft), technological chemistry, engineering (including 
hydraulic engineering), and veterinary arts, are not yet widely taught at university. 
For Herrmann, at least, all of these factors point to the need to establish public 
schools: “A talented teacher, a good textbook, and a collection of tools, materials, 
and wares can also, in my opinion, most reliably educate a technologue as useful for 
the state as advantageous to oneself.” [34] Herrmann also drafts a preliminary 
teaching program, which should, among other things: demonstrate the use of 
technology for the state, say something about the history of a particular trade or art, 
discuss materials, explain the processes involved with tool usage and describe the 
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tools themselves, teach students how to discriminate between good and bad products 
as well as areas of improvement, consider the conditions for introducing a new trade 
to a new country, and, last but not least, explain the use of the products in life. 
Teachers who intend to accomplish these goals, he muses, must necessarily have a 
collection of models, machines, drawings, and “technical products” (Kunstprodukten) 
at their disposal.
Taken together, the technological agendas of Beckmann, Lamprecht, and Herrmann 
cannot represent the entire complexity of the discussion about the problem of 
technology and its instruction around 1800, but their contributions give a sense of 
the varied perspectives on technology at that time and provide a point of departure 
for further thinking and comparison. From today’s point of view, it is equally 
instructive to observe to what degree these three thinkers differ as well as ways in 
which common concerns emerge. Much of this has to do with an awareness of limits, 
in both practical and philosophical terms.With regard to the latter: it should be clear 
by now that, theoretically speaking, technology is difficult to contain. Its objects and 
practices are so interwoven with other arts and sciences that it resists any attempts 
at tidy packaging. With regard to the former – the “practical” limits of technology – 
we can see that the problem Herrmann articulates as a matter of education can also 
be articulated in more general terms as a problem of knowledge transmission. His 
concern is equally with the material restrictions of class, i.e. the access to 
technological objects, and with the challenges of instruction: learning “about” the 
technical arts is by no means the same as learning the arts themselves. Young 
students of technology find themselves in a much different position than the first 
generation of self-proclaimed technologues: each judges the state of technology and 
the technological arts differently. Students of technology are not burdened by such 
questions such as Lamprecht’s, however – theirs is not the problem of creating a 
scientific system. Instead, as Herrmann emphasizes, their training is one of the 
technological gaze: one which begins by discerning and discriminating across 
materials, tools, and scales before becoming concerned with pursuing the chimera of 
a systematic whole. To perform acts of reasoned judgement in the classroom, in the 
workshop, and in the factories: this is the goal of a training that Herrmann predicts 
will be facilitated through progress in the public school system, a trajectory that will 
ultimately bypass the cumbersome, incomplete, and ultimately unviable technological 
systems altogether.
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